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NEVE-WELCH ENTERPRISES, INC., 
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Welch Furniture & Appliance, 
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UNITED BANK, • 
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A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant~ 
• 
• 
------------~---~-----------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent sued Appellant for stopping payment on a cashier's 
check .issued to Respondent by Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
without a Jury on February 4, 1980. The Court found in favor of 
Respondent and after amendments thereto the final Judgment, 
Conclusions of Law, and Fin~ings of Fact were signed April 9, 
-1-
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1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment and a deter-
mination that as a matter of law, a bank under certain 
circumstances, may stop payment on its cashier's check. 
Respondent has cross appealed the. trial court's refusal to grant 
damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tri-Power Electronics, hereafter Tri-Power began a liquida-
tion sale on or about April 17, 1979 which was to run through 
April 22, 1979. Neve-Welch (hereafter Respondent) attempting to 
·(·, ~~.' ~ -.... 
. .. -.......... 
- -take advantage of the situation created by Tri~Power's financial 
difficulties arranged to sell its own merchandise at Tri-Power's 
liquidation sale on Saturday and Sunday, April 21 & 22nd. (T.6, 
line 23). There was no segregation of merchandise (T.9, lines 11 
seq) and the proceeds from the sale of Respondent's merchandise, 
were co-mingled with those of Tri-Power's (T.9-13). 
On Sunday night, April 22, 1979, Respondent's President, 
George Welch told Lee Klein, President of Tri-Power, what amount 
Tri-Power owed them for Respondent's merchandise sold at the 
sale. (T.11, lines 28-30). Lee Klein told Welch to write up an 
accounting and that payment by cashier's would be coming the 
following morning (T.12, lines 4-7). 
-2-
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On Monday morning, April 23, 1979, George Welch, appeared at 
Tri-Power for payment. Lee Klein telephoned United Bank, 
hereafter Appellant, and spoke with Loren Urry, Senior 
Vice-President of Appellant and asked Urry to issue a cashier's 
check to Welch (T.14,15,16,51,52). 
George Welch testified that he was unaware of what was said 
by the bank officer over the phone (T.15, lines 4-5). Lee Klein 
testified that he told Mr. Urry that a sizeable deposit would be 
made that morning (T.52, lines 6-11). The apparent reason for 
this assurance was that the Tri-Power account at the bank was in 
overdraft at the close of business on April 20, Friday, and at 
the opening of business on Monday the 23rd in the amount of 
$5,778.58 (T.89-92). Lee Klein testified that he thought there 
·. !!' - - ' 
was a balance in the account when he spoke to M~. Urry (T.52, 
lines 16-18). He also testified that he thought there had been a 
deposit made on Saturday but that he had not made such deposit 
(T.52, lines 24-25 and T.53, lines 3-8). In any event, Lee Klein 
gave no check or other instrument to George Welch to present to 
Appellant to exchange for the cashier's check (T.45-46). 
On the morning of April 23, 1979, shortly after the aforemen-
tioned telephone conversation between Mr. Urry and Mr. Klein, 
George Welch picked up the cashier's check from Appellant and 
gave nothing for its issuance. The cashier's check was issued on 
the oral assurances of Lee Klein that the deposits would be made. 
An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed the morning of 
April 23, 1979 against Tri-Power and its assets seized including 
-3-
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deposits prepared for deposit to Appellant (T.74, lines 1-7, 
T.76, lines 23,24). 
There is some confusion as to whether or not some deposits 
were actually made. Evidence was presented over the strenuous 
objection of plaintiff's counsel that a number of checks which 
went to make up the alleged deposit were not paid. (T.77 and 
Exhibit D-17). At the close of business on Monday, April 23, 
1979, Tri-Power's account was overdrawn in the amount of 
$9,518.20. At the close of business on April 30, 1979, 
Tri-Power's account was in overdraft in the amount of $48,530.40 
(T.92 and 93). 
On April 25, 1979, Appellant stopped payment on its cashier's 
check (T.18, .lines 26-30 and T.19, lines 1-20, and Exhibit P-2) 
based on a failure of consiQe~ation. 
---.., 
.. :--
Respondent commenced action against Appellant on the theory 
that a bank may not stop payment on a cashier's check and is 
strictly liable thereon and for damages to its business and 
reputation. The trial Court found in favor of the Respondent for 
the face amount of the check only, plus interest. The additional 
damages sought for the lost profits and damages to reputation 
were denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNITED BANK HAS A RIGHT TO STOP PAYMENT ON 
ITS CASHIER'S CHECK WHEN IT IS ISSUED WITHOUT 
CONSIDERATION 
-4-
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The major issue in this case is whether or not a bank is 
strictly liable on a cashier's check or whether it can stop 
payment under certain circumstances, including failure of 
consideration. 
The Respondent contends that a bank is strictly liable once 
it issued a cashier's check regardless of the underlying 
transactions. The following excerpts from the trial transcript 
are illustrative. At T.72 beginning on line 4, the following 
exchange took place: 
MR. OLSEN: We will offer Exhibit 20-D, Your Honor. 
MR. Go WALL: We will object to this as lack of rele-
vancy and materiality. Whatever negotiations or procedures 
they may commonly have between themselves and Tri-Power, I 
don't think are relevant as to what procedures were used when 
Mr. Welch picked up the check. This is a transaction between 
Mr. Welch and the bank, and they are issuing that to him and 
it is not drawn at his requesi~or on his -account. 
I, therefore, don't think it is relevant on that basis. 
THE COURT: What do you claim for it, Mr. Olsen? 
MR. OLSEN: Only that it's the instrument by which the 
cashier's check was issued. 
THE COURT: I am not sure I understand what issue bears 
on~-as far as this trial is concerned. 
MR. OLSEN: It bears on the issue of why the cashier's 
check was issued by telephone, rather than some instrument 
having been brought in. 
THE COURT: It may be admitted for whatever probative 
value it may have. I am not quite sure I understand, but I 
will let it in. 
At T.77 beginning on line 21 and continuing over to T. 78, 
the exchange continued: 
MR. OLSEN: Is that a portion of the deposit, that exhi-
bit and those two checks, of the deposit which was brought in 
by Mr. Klein the first thing that morning? 
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A. (Mr. Urry) Yes, it is. 
Q. Now, were those checks in fact paid? 
MR. B. WALL: I will object, Your Honor. He issued the 
cashier's check, if he relied upon those checks or whatever 
the account, his testimony is that there were funds available 
in the account. 
THE COURT: Now, you are .taking the position that he has 
to rely on-- If he issues the check, it's almost--
MR. B. WALL: Strict liability. That is correct, Your 
Honor, because it is up to him to certify that check as to 
whether there are funds or not, and once he cuts loose that 
check, he in effect certifies and represents that those funds 
are on deposit with that bank. 
THE COURT: Well, it's not a certified check. 
MR. B. WALL: But he in effect represents that the·funds 
are available, and the only thing Mr. Welch would have had to 
have done was walk to their window and cashed it and they 
would have an obligation to honor it. 
THE COURT: It is a pity for Mr. Welch. He didn't know-
~ 
·~ ·-......... 
MR. B. WALL: Yes, but I ·think the la~ requires that 
same degree of responsibility. 
Finally, at T.89, counsel for Respondent again objected as 
follows: 
MR. B. WALL: "If Your Honor please, at this time, I 
would like to interpose an objection to this line of 
questioning. 
Now, the only reason I made the indication I did earlier 
about this very subject is the fact that the Court has enter-
tained some conditional receipt of another exhibit. I am, 
you know, concerned about that. I think for the record I 
would like to interpose and do interpose an objection to the 
relevancy of this continuing exhibit or anything to do with 
the account from the standpoint of its balance, in taking 
into account our theory of the case, they issued a cashier's 
check and what the balance was on a given hour or date, I 
fail to see the mater~ality of it. 
THE COURT: Okay, I understand your theory, Mr. Wall, and 
I am not sure that it is incorrect. It may be correct, but 
on the chance that is isn't, I am going to hear this. 
\. 
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MR. B. WALL: That's why I wanted to make the record on 
. t " 1 • 
This case is one of first impression in this jurisdiction and 
other jurisdictions seem to split on the issue. It has been held 
by a number of courts that a bank issuing a cashier's check may 
defend an action upon it on the ground that it was issued without 
consideration or through mistake, or that it was obtained through 
false representation. 10 Am.Jur •. 2d, .Banks §569. 
In a very recent case, TPO, Inc. vs. Federal Deposit Inc. 
Corp., 3rd Cir. N.J., (1973), 487 F2d 131, applying the New 
Jersey U.C.C., the Court followed this general rule. The Court 
indicated that a bank was not absolutely obligated by U.C.C. 
§4-303 to honor its own cashier's check when presented by a payee 
who was not a holder in due course, and was allegedly a party to 
-~ 
a scheme to defraud the bank,~but ·was entitled under U.C.C. 
§3-306 and §3-408 to present defenses that would be available on 
a simple contract, including lack of consideration or fraud. 
Other cases follow the above rule where the payee is not a 
? 
holder in due course. Mid Central Towing Co. v. National Bank 
of Tulsa, 348 Pa2d 327 (Oklahoma, 1960), Dakota Transfer & 
Storage Co. vs. Merchants National Bank, 86 N.W. 2d 639 (North 
Dakota, 1957). 
Appellant submits that it is completely within its rights to 
stop payment on its cashier's check. If the position of absolute 
liability on the check contended for by Respondent were followed 
to its logical extreme, the Respondent could recover even if it 
had alone perpetrated the fraud on Appellant. 
-7-
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One of the leading cases for the proposition of absolute 
liability on a cashier's ·check is Wertz vs. Richardson, 495 
S.W.2d 527 (Texas, 1973). The Court in Wertz, supra, by a 
four to three decision held that a cashier's check is accepted 
for payment when issued. The majority spoke in conclusionary 
terms and appeared to use circular reasoning in reaching the 
result it did. The Court unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish 
between a customers right to stop payment on a check and the 
bank's right to stop payment on its cashier's check. 
A cashier's check is nothing more than a check drawn by the 
bank the same as any other check would be drawn by an ordinary 
person. The only real distinction is that a bank is a depository 
for its own funds as well as those of other people. The type of 
. ' 
reasoning used in the majoritf opiriion of~Wertz~ supra, would 
force a bank to deal in cash or deposit its own money in 
another bank. 
The dissent in the Wertz case, supra, written by Judge 
Walker, is well reasoned and analytical. Judge Walker begins by 
distinguishing those cases where a remitter or third person, 
purchases or acquires a cashier's check for a payee and later 
tries to stop payment after transfer, as opposed to the situation 
in this case.' Here, Respondent as payee dealt directly with the 
Appellant and acquired the check directly from Appellant. 
Respondent stressed at trial, that this was an obligation 
between Appellant and Respondent. ~udge Walker, in the Wertz 
case continued: 
-8-
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"No one is attempting to order another person not to 
pay, and Respondent is not denying liability on the 
check because it was requested to do so or because 
of any claim or r.ight asserted by another person. 
Respondent has repudiated its obligation to pay on the 
ground that it has a legal defense to liability on the 
check, and the question to be decided is whether the 
asserted defense is good. In my opinion, it is not 
correct to say that a bank can never legally refuse to 
pay one of its cashier's checks. For example, a bank 
from which a cashier's check has been procured by fraud 
would certainly be entitled to set up the fraud and 
defeat liability as long as the check remains in the 
hands of the payee who perpetrated the fraud. The text 
writers agree that a bank may properly refuse to pay its 
cashier's check to the payee on the ground of failure of 
consideration or fraud. 5B Michie, Banks and Banking, 
§521 (Supp. 1972); 7 Zollman, Banks and Banking, 
§§4694, 4695. 495 S.W. 2d 572 at 575." (Emphasis added) 
Respondent took the cashier's check directly from Appellant. 
This is not a case where Respondent has transferred the check to 
an innocent third party. Respondent was given timely notice of 
the dishonor as well. 
--.......... . 
The question presented by this ·case is- simpl'y one of law and 
policy as to whether or not a bank can stop payment on its 
·cashier's check. A bank's right to stop payment under these cir-
cumstances is supported by both the reason and policy set forth 
in the foregoing legal authorities. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A HOLDER IN DUE 
COURSE AS DEFINED IN u.c.A. §70A-3-302 BECAUSE 
IT GAVE NO VALUE TO APPELLANT IN EXCHANGE FOR 
THE CASHIER'S CHECK. 
U.C.A. §70A-3~302 (1953), as amended, provides: 
"(l) A holder in due course is a holder who takes 
the instrument 
(a) for value; and 
(b) in good faith, and · 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been 
-9-
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dishonored or of any defense against or claim to 
it on the part of any person." 
70A-3-303, (1953), as amended, provides: 
"A holder takes the instrument for value 
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has 
been performed or that he acquires a security 
interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise 
than by legal process; or 
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of 
or as security for an antecedent claim against 
any person whether or not the claim is due; or 
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it 
or makes an irrevocable commitment to a third 
person." 
Respondent's agent, George Welch testified that he received 
no check or negotiable instrument from Tri-Power and delivered 
nothing to Appellant in exchange for the cashier's check. (T.45, 
line 30 and T.46, lines 1-6). Therefore, under U.C.A. 
§70A-3-303(c), Respondent could not be a holder in due course. 
. ' 
.· . ~~, ~ . -.......... 
With respect to U.C.A. §70A-3-303(a) official comment 3 to 
U.C.C. 3-303 which is identical to the above cited Section of the 
Utah Code provides: 
"(a) resolves an apparent conflict between the original 
Section 54 and first sentence of the original 
Section 25, by requiring that the agreed con-
sideration shall actually have been given. An 
executory promise to give value is not itself 
value, except as provided in paragraph (c). The 
underlying reason of policy is that when the 
purchaser learns of a defense against the instru-
ment or of a defect in the title, he is not 
required to enforce the instrument, but is free to 
rescind the transaction for breach of the transfers 
warranty. (§3-417). There is thus not the same 
necessity for giving him the status of a holder in 
due course, cutting off claims and defenses, as 
where he is actually paid value. A common 
illustration is the bank credit not drawn upon, 
which can be and is revoked when a claim or defense 
appears.: 
-10-
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Official comment 6 to the same Section goes on to state: 
"Paragraph (c) is new, but states generally recognized 
exceptions to the rule and that an executory promise 
is not value. A negotiable instrument is value 
because it carries a possibility of a negotiation to 
a holder in due course, after which the party who 
gives it cannot refuse to pay. The same reasoning 
applies to any irrevocable committment to the third 
person such as a letter of credit issued when an 
instrument is taken." 
The cashier's check was issued on the oral assurances by Lee 
Klein that the deposits would be made (T.52, line 6). This is an 
executory promise and does not qualify as value. Respondent at 
trial argued strenuously that the contract on the cashier's check 
was between it and Appellant and that Tri-Power's involvement is 
immaterial and irrelevant (T.72, lines 10-12). 
Again following Respondent's position asserted at trial, 
~· " --- ""\ 
_..,- . 
U.C.A. §70A-3-303(b) does not furnish the· consideration either. 
If Tri-Power allegedly owes money to Respondent and Respondent 
argues the deposits made by Tri-Power are irrelevant, that the 
balance in Tri-Power's account is immaterial and finally, 
that this is a contract only between Respondent and Appellant, 
then U.C.A. §70A-3-303 (b) is of little of no help to Respondent. 
Even if Respondent chooses to rely on this sub-section (b), 
close examination reveals its inapplicability. An example may 
illustrate this more clearly~ A owes B money. C owes A money 
and gives A a check or promissory note. A can transfer the note 
he received from C to B in exchange for release of the antecedent 
debt A owes B. B in this case would qualify as a holder in due 
course. 
, , 
• 
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In the present case, Tri-Power owed money to Neve-Welch. 
Tri-Power also owed money to United Bank inasmuch as its account 
was in overdraft status when this check was issued (T.89, lines 
92-93). Appellant tranferre? a cashier's check to Respondent 
based on the oral assurances of Lee Klein. The Respondent gave 
neither value nor consideration to Appellant for the cashier's 
check. Appellant over the objections of Respondent intruduced 
evidence that Tri-Power as well failed to give value or con-
sideration for the cashier's check. Appellant is under no obli-
gation to gratuitously assume the debt Tri-Power owes to the 
Respondent. 
Appellant submits that the interpretation of the meaning of 
"value" in the statute is a question of law and that the trial 
Court erred when it determined that Respondent gave value and 
-: , ~ ----
that good and valuable consideration had been paid by the 
Respondent in exchange for the cashier's check, when in fact 
neither Respondent nor Tri-Power ever gave any consideration for 
the cashier's check in question. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AND DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO RESPONDENTS CREDIT 
REPUTATION 
Respondent has chosen to cross-appeal on the following 
issues: 
1. Failure of the District Court to award damages for lost 
profits to plaintiff's by virtue.of defendant's failure to honor 
the cashier's check. 
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2. Failure of the District Court to award damages based on 
defendant's intentional,· reckless and unwarranted refusal to 
honor the cashier's check issued by it. 
3. Failure of the District Court to award damages for injury 
and damage to plaintiff's credit reputation." 
In the amendments to the findings of facts and conclusions of 
law signed by Judge Sawaya on April 9th, 1980, it states, at 
number 2(b): "The plaintiff is not entitled damages in addition 
to the amount of the check and the interest thereon, the basis 
therefor being too speculative." 
It is also a well settled legal principle that this Court 
will affirm the decision of the trial Court when its deter-
mination is supported by substantial evidence. Ranch Homes Inc • 
.. , l!r •.. '· 
vs. Greater Park fill Corporation,·' 592 ··P.2d 620_. (Utah, 1979). 
This Court will not upset the trial Court's determination unless 
it is "clearly against the weight of the evidence". Ream vs. 
Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145 (Utah, 1978), Winter vs. Charles Anthony, 
In.£!., 586 P2d 453 (Utah, 1978). 
Respondent presented absoluetly no evidence of Appellant's 
wilfulness or any malice in stopping payment of the check as is 
required for punitive or exemplary damages. Palombi vs. D & C 
Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
Damages for lost profits and to business reputation are con-
sidered too speculative to base an award of damages on. Howarth 
vs. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515. P.2d 442 (1973). 
There was substantial evidence that Respondent was in finan-
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cial difficulty well before the stop payment on this check. An 
independent audit conducted by a national accounting firm at 
Appellant's request revealed an almost consistant history of 
operating losses which actually diminished after Appellant 
stopped payment on the cashier's check in question (T.105-107) • 
. 
In addition,· funds to replace those represented by the stopped 
cashier's check were placed back into Respondents cash flow in 
less than thirty days(T.42,103, lines 13-25). 
Appellant submits that the trial Court was well within its 
discretion in refusing to award these damages and based on the 
foregoing, this Court should not upset those findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was within its rights to stop payment on its 
cashier's check. Respondents theory of strict liability is com-
---
_,,,,-
mercially unsound and not based on practicalities. 
Respondent does not qualify as a holder in due course because 
it did not take the instrument for value and gave Appellant 
nothing in exchange for the check. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
trial Court and determine as a matter of law that Appellant was 
within its rights to stop payment based on failure of 
consideration. 
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DATED this 4th day of August, 1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
DON E. OLSEN 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorney at Law 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of August, 
1980, I caused two copies each of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to be deposited in the United-~tates ~ail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed to: 
BRANT H. WALL 
GREGORY B. WALL 
WALL & WALL 
500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Neve Welch Enterprises 
DON E. OLSEN 
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